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Non-technical summary 
This paper examines how providing potential donors with information about the revenues of a 
charity affects charitable contributions. When individuals make a real-life donation decision, 
they usually do not have precise information about a charity’s income streams. They usually 
do not know whether and how much their neighbors or other people in their social community 
donate to a certain charity and it is questionable whether they are aware of the exact amount 
of government subsidies to that charity. They rather have a belief about the charity’s size in 
terms of entire revenues, i.e. whether it is small or large. 
With regard to the information about a charity’s revenues, various theoretical approaches may 
be relevant which do not necessarily point in the same direction. Some models assume a 
positive relationship between past revenues and donations while others suggest a negative 
relationship. So far, experimental studies have examined either the effect of government 
contributions or the effect of other private donations on charitable contributions but not the 
net effect thereof. 
Given the empirical nature of the problem and the gap in the experimental literature, we 
conducted a framed field experiment where a non-student subject pool was asked to make a 
real donation decision. Half of the subjects could choose whether to give to a charity with 
relatively low annual revenues or to a charity with relatively high annual revenues. 
Abstracting from other effects, such as the charities’ reputation, our results indicate a negative 
relation between a charity’s entire revenues and private donations to that charity. Our study 
also provides insights why donors prefer the small organizations and, therefore, discriminates 
between different theoretical approaches, offering a valuable insight to fundraisers. For most 
people the lower administrative costs, the higher impact of the own donation, and the 
neediness of the charity organization are decisive for choosing the small organization.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, inwieweit die Größe einer gemeinnützigen Organisation 
die Bereitschaft, an diese Organisation zu spenden, beeinflusst. Wenn sich Personen in der 
Realität für oder gegen eine Spende an eine gemeinnützige Organisation entscheiden, wissen 
sie üblicherweise nicht, wie sich die Einnahmen dieser Organisation genau zusammensetzen. 
Sie wissen nicht, wie viel ihr Nachbar oder andere Personen aus ihrem sozialen Umfeld an die 
Organisation spenden oder in welcher Höhe die Organisation staatliche Subventionen erhält. 
Die Spender haben vielmehr einen Eindruck von der Größe der Organisation in Form ihrer 
jährlichen Gesamteinnahmen, das heißt sie wissen, ob eine Organisation eher groß oder eher 
klein ist. 
Die verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätze, die für diese Fragestellung relevant sind, deuten 
nicht alle in die gleiche Richtung. Einige gehen von einem positiven Zusammenhang 
zwischen Einnahmen einer Organisation und der Bereitschaft, an diese Organisation zu 
spenden, aus, während andere einen negativen Zusammenhang vermuten. Experimentelle 
Studien haben bislang entweder nur die Wirkung staatlicher Subventionen oder nur die 
Wirkung sozialer Information über die privaten Beiträge anderer Spender untersucht, nicht 
jedoch den Nettoeffekt.  
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, diese Lücke zu schließen. Wir haben dazu ein Experiment 
durchgeführt, in dem nicht-studentische Versuchspersonen eine reale Spendenentscheidung 
getroffen haben. Die Hälfte der Versuchspersonen konnte sich dabei zwischen einer relativ 
kleinen Organisation mit geringen Jahreseinnahmen und einer relativ großen Organisation mit 
hohen Jahreseinnahmen entscheiden. Unsere Resultate zeigen einen negativen 
Zusammenhang zwischen der Organisationsgröße und der Spendenbereitschaft, wobei wir 
bewusst von Reputationseffekten abstrahiert haben. Die Studie zeigt außerdem, warum 
Spender kleine Organisationen bevorzugen. Sie kann damit zwischen verschiedenen 
theoretischen Ansätzen diskriminieren und liefert wichtige Informationen für die effektive 
Mitteleinwerbung von Fundraisern. Für die Mehrheit der Spender sind die geringeren 
Verwaltungsaufwendungen, das höhere Gewicht der eigenen Spende und die Bedürftigkeit 
der Einrichtung ausschlaggebend für die Wahl der kleinen Organisation. 
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Abstract: 
This paper studies the effect of information about a charity’s size on individuals’ donations to 
that charity. We conducted a framed field experiment with a non-student sample, in which 
subjects had the opportunity to donate for various charitable purposes. The results show that if 
subjects are to choose between large organizations with high annual revenues and small 
organizations with low revenues, they prefer the small organizations. We also provide insights 
why donors prefer the small organizations and discriminate between different theoretical 
approaches. 
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1. Introduction 
When individuals make a real-life donation decision, they usually do not have precise 
information about a charity’s income streams. They do not know whether and how much their 
neighbors or other people in their social community donate to a certain charity. Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether they are aware of the exact amount of government subsidies given 
to that charity. They rather have a belief about the charity’s size in terms of entire revenues, 
i.e. whether it is small or large. 
With regard to the information about a charity’s revenues, various approaches may be 
relevant: Theoretical models predict complete or incomplete crowding out of voluntary 
contributions by government financial support. Furthermore, an impact philanthropist may 
prefer to give to smaller charities to increase the relative impact of his donation, while the 
approaches of quality signaling and conditional cooperation predict that larger charities may 
be chosen more frequently. So far, however, experimental studies have examined either the 
effect of government financial support on voluntary contributions or the effect of social 
information on private donations but not the net effect. Experimental evidence hints at 
incomplete crowding out of private donations by government subsidies, while several studies 
on social information find a positive relation between others’ contributions and those of one’s 
own.  
To fill this gap in the literature, we question how providing potential donors with information 
about the revenues of a charity affects charitable contributions. To this end, we conducted a 
framed field experiment where a non-student subject pool was asked to make a real donation 
decision. Half of the subjects could choose whether to give to a charity with relatively low 
annual revenues or to a charity with relatively high annual revenues. Our study is the first that 
presents evidence on the net effect and it shows a negative relation between a charity’s entire 
revenues and private donations to that charity. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: The second part summarizes the findings of the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature and motivates our experimental framework. Part 
three describes the experimental setting and the fourth part delivers the results of the 
experiment. Part five concludes. 
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2. Background and Motivation 
In this paper, we study the effect of third-party contributions on individual donations to 
charitable organizations. Third-party contributions to a charity may stem from governmental 
subsidies or other individuals’ donations, respectively. Theoretical models and empirical 
studies have looked at the effects of both sources of charities’ income on private donations. 
The standard public goods model (Warr, 1982, Roberts, 1984, Bergstrom et al., 1986) predicts 
that private voluntary contributions are completely crowded out by government contributions 
to the same good. In this model, an individual derives utility from his private consumption as 
well as the total supply of the public good. If a contributing individual is taxed in order to 
finance the public good, he decreases his voluntary contributions by exactly the same amount, 
as long as the taxes to be paid do not exceed the voluntary contribution he made previous to 
the taxation. It is reasonable, though, to assume that a potential donor also derives positive 
utility from the mere act of contributing. Andreoni (1989, 1990) coined the term ‘warm glow’ 
to describe such preferences, where an individual’s utility increases with the amount 
contributed. In this case, government contributions are not a perfect substitute for voluntary 
contributions, which implies that the former crowd out the latter only incompletely: An 
individual’s contribution decreases by less than the exact amount of government’s 
contributions.1 
The empirical evidence on the theoretical predictions of crowding out is mixed. In a literature 
review, Steinberg (1991) concludes crowding out of private charitable contributions by 
government spending to be between 0.5% and 35%. Also, more recent studies provide 
evidence for incomplete crowding out (among others Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002, Gruber and 
Hungerman, 2007, Andreoni and Payne, 2009). There is, however, also empirical evidence for 
crowding in of voluntary contributions (Khanna et al., 1995, Khanna and Sandler, 2000, 
Payne, 2001). Arulampalam et al. (2009) use charity-level data for the special case of UK 
overseas development charities. They find no crowding-out of donations to development by 
official development assistance, however their results hint at a modest positive effect of 
government grants on private giving. This implies that donors may be attracted to charities 
which receive substantial support from the state.  
                                                 
1 Steinberg (1987) proposes a model of mixed motives in which donations may not necessarily be a normal good. 
He shows that individuals’ contributions may rise or fall in response to an increase in government’s 
contributions. Moreover, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that with impurely altruistic preferences both 
asymptotically zero and asymptotically complete crowding out may occur. 
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Furthermore, several laboratory experiments try to test the hypothesis of complete crowding 
out. Andreoni (1993) compared two groups of subjects that use the same mechanism to 
provide a public good, but face different levels of government provision. A minimum 
contribution level of two tokens is meant to resemble a tax which is used to finance a public 
good. If there was complete crowding out, average contributions (including the two tokens 
tax) should be the same in both groups. However, the author finds that crowding out is 
incomplete. Chan et al. (2002) use the same mechanism to confirm the result and extend it by 
the finding that crowding out increases as the size of the involuntary transfer increases. Bolton 
and Katok (1998) let subjects play a dictator game and vary the initial endowments of 
dictators and recipients (from $15 for the dictator and $5 for the recipient to $18 and $2, 
respectively). They find that the proportion of non-givers does not differ across the 
treatments, but that individuals in the 15-5 treatment give less, so there is some crowding out. 
Eckel et al. (2005) use the same mechanism, but control for fiscal illusion and the recipients 
are charities. If there is no fiscal illusion, i.e. the subject knows that the initial allocations are 
resulting from being taxed, there is support for the theoretical prediction of complete 
crowding out. In case of fiscal illusion, however, crowding out is zero. Konow (2010) keeps 
the endowment of the dictator fixed but changes the endowment of the recipient in the subsidy 
treatment from $0 to $4 and confirms the result of partial crowding out. 
As charities do not only earn income from government contributions, further theoretical 
approaches have to be taken into account. Duncan’s (2004) theory of impact philanthropy 
relates to individuals who aim at having a distinct effect on the supply of a charitable good, 
i.e. they want to ‘personally make a difference’. Hence, an impact philanthropist may benefit 
from a charity’s lower income. This is because an increase in the revenues of a charity or 
others’ contributions causes negative externalities – the importance and the impact of the 
philanthropist’s donation are reduced. It then may be that an impact philanthropist – if 
provided with the choice between two charities of different size – chooses to give to the 
charity with smaller income streams because this increases the relative impact of his gift.2 
Moreover, an impact philanthropist dislikes financing the administrative costs of a charity. If 
a philanthropist assumes larger charities to have greater administrative costs, he would prefer 
to give to the smaller organization. In yet another theoretical model, Andreoni (1998) assumes 
the existence of a nonconvexity in the production function of the public good, i.e. a minimum 
                                                 
2 The theoretical model suggested by Duncan, however, leads to no clear predictions how a change in the 
endowment of a charity or in the contributions of others would affect the size of the gift. 
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threshold that must be met for the public good to be consumed. He shows that in this case 
others’ contributions may be regarded as substitutes for one’s own. 
On the other hand, however, models have been proposed which suggest that a positive effect 
of third-party contributions on individuals’ donations may prevail. One approach is to model 
contributions by other individuals as a signal of the charity’s quality as Vesterlund (2003) 
suggests. Typically, donations are not made simultaneously, but rather in a sequential manner, 
where high donations by other individuals suggest a high-quality charity which may induce 
individuals to give larger amounts to that organization. Andreoni (2006) remarks that 
leadership gifts may also be perceived as a signal for the respective charity’s quality. To make 
this signal credible, however, the leadership gift has to be sufficiently high. So, if a charity 
with higher revenues is perceived to be of a higher quality it should be targeted by donors 
more likely than a charity with lower revenues. What is more, the phenomenon of conditional 
cooperation predicts that individuals will be more willing to contribute if they know that 
others contribute (Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
Several natural field experiments investigate how information about others’ contributions 
affects charitable donations. Frey and Meier (2004) present evidence from a large-scale field 
experiment on conditional cooperation. They find that when students are presented with 
information that many other fellows donated to certain charitable funds, their willingness to 
contribute increases. The studies of Croson and Shang (2008; 2009) support this finding. 
Their setting is an on-air fundraising campaign for a public radio station where another 
member’s contribution is mentioned to participants before they make their own pledge. The 
results of their field experiment show that (social) information about others’ high 
contributions influences one’s own contributions positively. The information effect also 
works downwardly. When renewing donors are presented with information about another 
donor’s contribution which is either above or below their last year’s contribution, respondents 
adjust their contribution in the direction of the information (Croson and Shang, 2008). Croson 
and Shang (2010), however, demonstrate a natural limitation of the social information effect. 
When the social information is too extreme, it may lead to lower individual contributions. 
Also, Martin and Randal (2008) show that donors positively respond to information about 
others’ contributions. Using field data from an art gallery, they find that depending on the 
composition of coins and bills in a transparent donation box, the more bills are exhibited 
relative to coins the lower is the participation rate and the higher is the average donation. 
While these two opposing effects level off, so that similar total donation amounts are realized 
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across these treatments, a displayed donation box which is empty induces lower overall 
donations.3  
In summary, previous experimental studies indicate that there is incomplete crowding out of 
voluntary contributions by government contributions and that providing information about 
others’ contributions increases either the propensity to donate, the size of the donation, or 
both. Our approach differs from previous experiments in two important aspects. First of all, 
the information presented to each subject in our experiment consists of two intervals stating 
the yearly revenues received by an organization which comprises donations, membership fees 
and public subsidies. We deem this kind of information to be very close to the situation 
potential donors find themselves in the real world, as they usually cannot distinguish the size 
of other donors’ gifts and may not be aware of the extent to which a charity receives 
government subsidies. The information is provided to distinguish charities by their size. 
Donations to larger organizations could mirror the fact that charities’ revenues serve as a 
signal for good quality of a charity whereas donations to smaller organizations might reflect 
crowding out at the organization level or the aim at having a higher relative impact through 
the donation. Our framework however, is not meant to test for crowding out of voluntary 
contributions to a certain public good, e.g. development aid. If a subject chooses to give to a 
small development organization instead of the large one, he still consumes the public good. 
Hence, crowding out rather happens on the organizational level. 
Secondly, we use a framed field experiment rather than a natural field experiment. Unlike in a 
natural field experiment, subjects in a framed field experiment undertake the task in an 
artificial environment and know that they are part of an experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). 
Although this may bias the subjects’ behavior to some extent, we can make use of the 
advantages of framed field experiments in terms of more control and the elicitation of 
personal characteristics of our participants. In addition, we can exploit that the donation 
decisions are made completely anonymously in our setting. In door-to-door-fundraising, 
solicitation letter campaigns or other kinds of donation campaigns the identity of the donor is 
usually known to the organization. By means of our double-blind procedure however, neither 
other experimental subjects nor the experimenter know the amount of the donation made by a 
certain donor. This enables us to rule out an experimenter effect or certain motivations such as 
signaling of wealth, prestige or social approval. That such social incentive effects can arise 
                                                 
3 The experimental literature on seed money may also be used to study the effect of information on charitable 
giving. In seed money experiments, it is announced that some particular amount has already been collected or 
provided by an anonymous donor or institution. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Landry et al. (2006), and 
Rondeau and List (2008) all find a positive effect of seed money on individual donations. 
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from removing anonymity is shown in the field (Soetevent, 2005) as well as in the lab 
(Hoffman et al. 1994; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004).  
Furthermore, framed field experiments are characterized by a non-student subject pool and 
field context in the commodity and therefore offer more realism than conventional lab 
experiments (Harrison and List, 2004). A weakness of lab experiments is often seen in the 
weak representativeness of the sample and thus the lacking generalizability of results. 
Especially in the case of donation decisions representativeness might be important. Carpenter 
et al. (2008) for example show in a laboratory experiment that students tend to be less likely 
to donate to a charity than members from the broader community.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Implementation and Participants 
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of Mannheim, 
Germany (see Appendix C). The letter contained an invitation to take part in a scientific study 
and informed people that they would receive €40 for participation. It was announced that 
there would be a kind of survey in which they could (voluntarily and anonymously) make 
consumption decisions. We used a relatively high show-up fee in order to avoid 
underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of time. Furthermore, we already 
emphasized in the invitation letter that the money was a reward for participation in the study 
in order to make people feel entitled to their endowment and to avoid a bias due to unexpected 
gift money. The experiment took place in July 2009 on the premises of the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. A total of 223 participants took part in 
the experiment. At the beginning of each session, participants individually drew lots to 
determine their ID number (which remained unknown to other participants and the 
experimenters) and chose a table. The tables had privacy screens on every side to ensure 
private decisions and answers. Participants were not allowed to talk to each other. If they had 
questions, the experimenters answered them privately. The 12 experimental sessions lasted 
around 60 minutes each. Within one session, all subjects performed exactly the same task. At 
first, all participants obtained detailed instructions about the course of the experiment (see 
Appendix B). The main features were orally repeated. We emphasized that all information 
given in the instructions was true. Participants in all treatments filled out a questionnaire with 
questions about socio-demographic characteristics, their donation habits, and their attitude 
toward their own social standing within society and toward governmental responsibilities. The 
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attitudinal questions were taken from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) which is 
conducted every two years with a representative sample of the German population.4 At the 
end of each session, participants had the chance to comment on the experiment and to give 
reasons for their decisions (see Figure A1 in Appendix A for a detailed overview of the 
experimental proceedings). 
Participants’ socio-demographic characteristics are shown in Appendix A (Tables A1 and 
A2). The subject pool is highly diversified with for example age ranging from 18 to 75 years. 
Although it is not fully representative of the German resident population, it is sufficiently 
diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to examine the influence of each 
variable on charitable behavior. Moreover, in case of gender, income, and religion, the 
distribution of our subject pool does not significantly differ from that of the German 
population (chi squared test, t-test, p>0.1)5. More precisely, 46.2% of subjects are male. 
22.9% dispose of a monthly net household income of less than €1,000, most of the subjects 
live in households with incomes between €1,000 and €3,000 and only 13.0% have more than 
€3,000 per month disposable. With regard to religion, Catholics (31.4%) and Protestants 
(31.8%) are equally represented, whereas 6.7% possess another religious affiliation and 
30.0% of all subjects do not belong to any religious community. Participants’ responses to 
questions regarding their giving behavior in the past as well as their attitudes are also 
displayed in Appendix A (Tables A3 and A4).  
 
3.2 Treatments 
The experiment comprised two treatments which both contained a real donation stage where 
subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much (if any) of their endowment to 
donate to a certain charity. Subjects were informed that all of the selected charities have 
obtained the ‘DZI Spendensiegel’, a label for charities that use their funds economically and 
according to their statutes.6 Subjects could choose one of four charitable causes, namely 
disabled care, development aid, medical research, and animal protection, whereby subjects 
knew only the purpose but not the name of the organizations to avoid any reputation effects. 
All donation decisions were completely voluntary and anonymous. We used a double-blind 
procedure in which neither other subjects nor experimenters came to know if, how much and 
to which cause a subject donated. Subjects received a large envelope containing two small 
                                                 
4 For detailed information, see http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus/. 
5 Unless stated otherwise, all tests in this paper are two-sided. 
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envelopes and the endowment of €40 broken into two 10-euro notes, one 5-euro note, six 2-
euro coins, and three 1-euro coins. This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer 
amount between €0 and €40 and abated incentives to only give the coins. Subjects placed the 
amount they wished to donate in one of the small envelopes assigned to donations, labeled the 
envelope with their ID number and, in case they were willing to give a positive amount, the 
charitable cause to which they wished to donate. The amount of money subjects wished to 
keep for themselves was placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, subjects dropped the 
sealed envelope specified for donations in a box.  
The baseline treatment (“NoInfo”) with 113 subjects involved the above described donation 
stage and afterwards the completion of the questionnaire. The 110 subjects in the treatment 
“Info” were informed not only about the charitable cause of the organizations but also about 
their revenues taken by donations, membership fees and public subsidies in 2006. For each 
charitable cause, we offered two organizations, one relatively small organization with 
revenues between €40,000 and €300,000 and one relatively large organization with revenues 
between €5 million and €11 million. Thus, subjects in this treatment could choose one of eight 
organizations for their donation. All donations made during the experiment were transferred 
in full to the respective organizations. In case of the NoInfo treatment, donations were equally 
assigned to small and large organizations of the same cause. The counting of donations and 
the transfer to the organizations were notarially monitored and certified. This procedure and 
the name of the notary were already announced in the experimental instructions.7 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
In total, €1,225 are donated to the charities. Mean donation per participant is €5.49 or 13.7% 
of the endowment, median donation is €3.00. Broken down by purposes, €448 are donated to 
disabled care, €318 to development aid, €274 to medical research, and €185 to animal 
protection. Disabled care is not only the purpose which is selected most frequently (21%) but 
which also receives the highest average donations (9.53€). Whereas individual donations do 
not differ significantly between the four purposes, subjects select animal protection less 
frequently than the other three purposes (binomial test 1% significance). Overall, 33 % of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de. 
7 Some participants also completed another task (a dictator game) in the experiment which is not part of this 
paper. As this task did not affect the donation decision, we pooled the data. 
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subjects do not make a donation at all. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the 
donation distribution. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Observations Share in % Total donation  
(in €) 
Average donation 
(in €) 
No donation 74           33           0 0    
Donation 149           67           1,225           8.22    
 Disabled care 47          21 448          9.53    
 Development aid 39           17          318           8.15    
 Medical research 38 17                    274           7.21    
 Animal protection 25           11          185          7.40    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49     
In the NoInfo treatment in which subjects did not obtain information about charity revenues, 
mean donation per participant is €5.56 and in the Info treatment in which subjects obtain this 
information, mean donation is €5.43 (compare Table 2). Interestingly, providing participants 
with this information neither has an impact on individual donations nor on the probability to 
select a certain charitable cause. However, it shifts donations within the group of subjects who 
obtained the information: €455 are donated to small organizations and €132 are donated to 
large organizations. On average, participants donate €8.92 to small organizations and €6.95 to 
large organizations; this difference, however, is not statistically significant.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – NoInfo versus Info Treatment 
 Observations Share in % by 
treatment 
Total donation  
(in €) 
Average donation 
(in €) 
NoInfo treatment 113           100          628 5.56   
 No donation 35         31 0           0 
 Donation 78         69 628         8.05    
Info treatment 110          100 597 5.43 
 No donation 39 36 0 0 
 Small organization 51 46 455 8.92 
 Large organization 19 17 132 6.95    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49     
Out of the 110 subjects who received information and made a positive donation, 73% choose 
the small organization, and only 27% choose the large organization. Thus, the shift of 
donations occurs mainly because small organizations are selected more frequently than large 
organizations (binomial test 1% significance). We observe this effect for all charitable causes 
(at least 5% significance each), compare Figure 1. The preference for small organizations 
appears to be very pronounced in the case of disabled care: Here, 86% of donors choose the 
small organization and 14% choose the large one. In case of development aid (medical 
research, animal protection), 68% (64%, 69%) of donors select the small organization. 
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Figure 1: Selection of organization size in the Info treatment [in % of donors] 
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In the theory section we have proposed different explanations why people may prefer small 
organizations to large ones. However, we cannot be sure whether these reasons actually 
induced the subjects to choose the small organization. There are several other possible reasons 
for people’s preferences which are not captured by the theoretical models. For example, small 
organizations might be associated with more local activities.  
For this reason, we conducted an ex-post online survey with the subjects who participated in 
the Info treatment. The survey was completely anonymous and contained questions about the 
decisions in the experiment, namely (i) whether subjects donated a positive amount, if so (ii) 
to which charitable cause, (iii) to a small or a large organization, and given that choice (iv) for 
what reason they chose the small or the large organization. All questions offered 
predetermined answers including the option “I cannot remember”. If participants had chosen 
the small organization, they were provided with the following answers: “For my decision to 
donate to the small organization, it was decisive that (a) my donation to the small organization 
has a higher impact compared to a large organization, (b) small organizations are 
discriminated against compared to large ones and therefore need more support, (c) small 
organizations have lower administrative costs compared to large ones and therefore my 
donation is more likely to benefit the actual charitable cause, (d) small organizations are more 
likely to act on a local level compared to large ones, (e) small organizations are more 
specialized in certain fields of activity compared to large ones, (f) other reasons.” If 
participants had chosen the large organization, they were provided with these options: “For 
 10
my decision to donate to the large organization, it was decisive that (a) the large organization 
was able to already collect many funds (consisting of donations, membership fees and public 
subsidies), (b) large organizations can achieve more with my donation than the small ones, (c) 
large organizations have a higher level of familiarity compared to small ones, (d) large 
organizations are more likely to act professionally compared to small ones, (e) other reasons.” 
In both cases, the predetermined options randomly varied between participants, they could 
select several options and give further reasons in an open description field.  
Figure 2: Reasons to choose the small organization [in % of donors] 
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Out of the 104 individuals who were invited to the survey 81 individuals took part.8 The 
statements made in the survey are consistent with the observed behavior in the experiment, 
i.e. there are no significant differences between the survey data and the experimental data. For 
example, the 68% of responders stating in the survey that they donated a positive amount 
correspond to 64% who in fact donated a positive amount in the experiment. Let us first 
consider the people who had chosen the small organization. The reasons for this decision 
which are mentioned most frequently are lower administrative costs (50%) and a possible 
higher impact of the own donation (44%). Recall that these are the motives that are captured 
by the impact theory. Another reason which is mentioned frequently is the neediness of small 
organizations (39%), indicating the existence of a crowding out effect at the organizational 
level (see Figure 2).  
                                                 
8 As an incentive to participate, everyone who completed the survey took part in a drawing for 5 times 30 Euros. 
A few people completed the survey via mail because they did not provide an email address. Six participants in 
the Info treatment were not invited to the survey because they did not provide any contact details. 
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Regarding the choice of the large organization the most frequently stated reason is the 
professionalism of large organizations (86%) followed by the achievement of objectives 
(43%) and the apparent ability to acquire funds (29%). All these motivations support the 
quality signaling approach. However, this signal attracts only few donors. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Besides looking at the effects of the various treatments, we ran econometric estimations to 
analyze the impact of various socio-demographic variables which have been surveyed in the 
questionnaire. Around 33% of the subjects decided not to donate, hence there is a large 
number of observations clustered at zero donations. In this case, ordinary least squares 
estimates would not be accurate, so we conduct a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit 
model. In the baseline estimation, we include the following socio-demographic variables: age, 
household size as the absolute number of household members including children, dummy 
variables for male subjects, unmarried subjects, subjects not having any religious affiliation 
(no religion), voters of the left party, highly educated subjects (education, owning a graduate 
degree), high income subjects (monthly net household income of 2.000 € or more). 
It is very likely, however, that there are unobservable features influencing the decision 
whether to make a charitable contribution or not. Therefore, we additionally include four 
attitudinal variables taken from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) to control for 
one’s perceived standing within society and the attitude towards the state. More precisely, the 
variable position is a dummy variable for subjects thinking they receive their fair share or 
more compared to others living in Germany. The variable disparities is coded as ‘1’ for those 
subjects believing that the social disparities in Germany are just. The variable state resp is a 
dummy for subjects who want the state to care for a good living in case of illness, misery, 
unemployment and old age. Similarly, the variable equalize takes the value ‘1’ if a subject 
indicated that it is the responsibility of the state to reduce income disparities. Although it is 
quite common to include attitudinal variables in econometric estimations (e.g. Corneo and 
Grüner, 2002), the causality between these variables and the dependent variable (donations) 
may run in both directions, i.e. these variables may be endogenous. For this reason, Table 3 
displays both estimations with attitudinal variables and those without these variables in order 
to show whether effects are robust to this modification. The second specification furthermore 
includes a dummy variable for subjects that already made a charitable donation in the year 
2009 (donor 2009) in order to control for offsetting effects. Furthermore, we ran both 
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estimations with and without outliers. Outliers were defined as those subjects contributing 
more than half their endowment (€20) in the donation decision (five subjects).  
Table 3: Tobit estimation results 
 Including outlier Excluding outlier 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
_cons -11.27*** -9.088* -5.904* -5.685 
 (-2.671) (-1.931) (-1.782) (-
age 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.170*** 0.183*** 
 (3.760) (3.780) (3.461) (3.648
male -1.563 -1.658 -0.773 -1.083 
 (-1.094) (-1.147) (-0.689) (-0.950) 
household size  -0.00620 -0.125 -0.298 -0.461 
 (-0.00738) (-0.147) (-0.451) (-0.686) 
unmarried 6.419*** 5.893*** 4.193*** 4.099** 
 (3.201) (2.939) (2.646) (2.572
no religion  -1.279 -1.200 -3.179** -3.120**
 (-0.812) (-0.762) (-2.522) (-2.457) 
left party  -9.109*** -9.315*** -6.822*** -6.611*** 
 (-2.996) (-2.996) (-2.899) (-2.747) 
education   3.991*** 3.962** 2.187* 2.271*
 (2.622) (2.593) (1.834) (1.890
income 4.695*** 4.614*** 3.357** 3.353**
 (2.722) (2.675) (2.480) (2.470
donor 2009   -2.194  -1
  (-1.333)  (-
position  0.0959  -0
  (0.0621)  (-
disparities  0.988  1.730 
  (0.605)  (1.349
state resp  -2.541  -0
  (-1.411)  (-
equalize  1.100  -0
  (0.748)  (-
No. of observations 
LR Chi²  
Pseudo R²  
189 
44.53*** 
0.0418 
189 
49.09*** 
0.0460 
184 
39.95*** 
0.0414 
184 
43.39*** 
0.0450 
1.532) 
) 
) 
 
 
) 
 
) 
.369 
1.058) 
.301 
0.248) 
) 
.212 
0.145) 
.467 
0.398) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimations (3) and (4) exclude outliers. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance.  
Our results show a positive and highly significant effect of age on charitable donations, 
whereas the coefficients for male donors and household size are not significant. This finding 
is robust across all four models. Moreover, across all four estimations, voters of the left party 
on average give significantly smaller amounts than all other subjects. Surprisingly, being 
unmarried affects the donation decision positively and significantly. It may be suspected that 
unmarried subjects, as they may have less responsibility for other people in their everyday 
life, feel more obliged to help others with their donation. 
Subjects without a religious affiliation seem to make significantly lower contributions, but the 
corresponding coefficient is only significant when outliers are excluded. As expected from 
previous empirical investigations, high incomes and high education both have a positive 
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impact on donations although the significance levels vary according to the estimation 
specification. The relation between donations in the experiment and donations that have been 
made in the year 2009 previously to the experiment is as expected negative, though not 
significant. Furthermore, the attitudinal variables do not have any explanatory power.  
We have seen that small organizations are preferred by the donors and certain characteristics 
influence the donation behavior differently. In a further step we now investigate whether 
subjects’ characteristics differ with respect to the donation choice. As we face three possible 
outcomes (no donation, donation to a small organization and donation to a large organization), 
a multinomial response model is appropriate. Since we assume that adding another donation 
category, e.g. a medium sized organization, affects the donation decision of donors and non-
donors differently, the assumption of the irrelevance of independent alternatives does not hold 
in our case. Therefore, we make use of the nested logit model. In particular, we define two 
nests in which one nest consists of all non-donors of the Info treatment while the other nest 
contains all donors that donated to either a small or a large organization. As the base variable 
we choose the outcome “small organization” as it was selected most frequently by the 
subjects. We use the same explanatory variables as in the first specification of Table 3. The 
earlier defined outliers are included in our analysis as the decision to donate or not to donate 
is now the major point of interest (rather than the size of the donation). Furthermore, the 
results do not change if we exclude the outliers. 
From Table 4 we see that donors who donate to a small organization do not significantly 
differ from donors who donate to a large organization (column 2). When comparing the 
donors to the small organization with the non-donors (column 1), we find that donors to small 
organizations are more likely to be unmarried than the non-donors (p<0.1). This result 
confirms the findings we reported earlier in Table 3.9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We also investigated in how far personal characteristics influence the choice of the charitable cause differently. 
The results turn out to be insignificant: with help of a nested logit model we find that subjects who donated to 
disabled care do not have significantly different characteristics compared to people who donate to development 
aid, medical research or animal protection. 
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Table 4: Nested logit estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Variable No organization Large organization 
age -0.011  
(0.013)  
0.046 
(0.042) 
male 0.068 
(0.613)  
-0.587 
(1.251) 
household size       0.357 
(0.363)  
0.409 
(0.912) 
unmarried -1.008* 
(0.559) 
1.227 
(1.386) 
no religion        -0.571 
(1.169)  
-3.242 
(2.679)  
left party         -3.119  
(2.902) 
-5.259 
(4.168) 
education   -1.155 
(0.708)  
1.239 
(1.573) 
income -0.649  
(0.781)  
0.028 
(1.666) 
No. of observations 
Wald test: Prob > chi2 = 0.5375 
LR test for IIA:  Prob > chi2 = 0.0931 
279                         279  
Notes: base variable: small organization. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Levels of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The results of our experiment contribute to understanding how the provision of information 
about charities’ revenues affects individual donation decisions. We find that subjects prefer to 
give to small charities with relatively low revenues as compared to large charities. Thus, our 
results support the predictions that may be derived from the model of impact philanthropy by 
Duncan (2004), which assumes that donors try to achieve the biggest impact possible with 
their charitable contribution, as well as from the public goods model, which predicts 
incomplete crowding out of voluntary contributions by third party contributions. Our survey 
data shows that quality considerations as suggested by Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni 
(2006) play a role for those few donors that chose to give to large organizations.  
The type of information we announced in our experiment differs from that used in other 
experiments: To our knowledge, this is the first study which provides participants with the 
information about a charity’s entire revenues. We deem this kind of information to be more 
realistic because in real-life donation decisions, individuals usually do not precisely know 
whether and how much other individuals have given and to which extent a charity is 
subsidized by government. While the announcement of other individuals’ contributions is 
likely to lead to the emergence of anchor points or the desire to comply with own or others’ 
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expectations, the information provided in our experiment does not point in one specific 
direction but rather offers two charities of different size. Considerations like signaling of 
wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) or social approval (Holländer, 1990) are not relevant in our 
anonymous setting. Thus, varying the content of (social) information can be a fruitful area of 
further research. 
The results of our experiment confirm previous findings that the individual willingness to 
donate increases with subjects’ age, income, and education (e.g. Pharoah and Tanner, 1997, 
Schervish and Havens, 1997). This suggests that donation decisions in our experiment are a 
good indicator of real-life decisions. Unmarried individuals donate significantly more and 
voters of the left party donate significantly less than others. As individuals with certain 
characteristics are more likely to react positively when provided with the opportunity to make 
a donation, fundraisers may be able to increase donations by specifically targeting those 
individuals. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part I 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
103 
119 
1 
46.19 
53.36 
0.45 
Age 18 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60 – 75  
No answer 
73 
60 
54 
34 
2 
32.74 
26.91 
24.22 
15.25 
0.90 
Family Status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
No answer 
139 
45 
31 
6 
2 
62.33 
20.18 
13.90 
2.69 
0.90 
Children Yes 
No 
34 
189 
15.25 
84.75 
Household 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
No answer 
102 
82 
21 
17 
1 
45.74 
36.77 
9.42 
7.62 
0.45 
Education University 
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 
Realschule (10 years of education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 
Other 
No graduation 
88 
58 
35 
23 
17 
2 
39.46 
26.01 
15.70 
10.31 
7.62 
0.90 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Italian 
Polish 
Other 
No answer 
192 
2 
3 
2 
23 
1 
86.10 
0.90 
1.35 
0.90 
10.31 
0.45 
   223 100.00 
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Table A2: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part II 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Household net 
income 
< 1,000 € 
1,000 – 2,000 € 
2,000 – 3,000 € 
3,000 – 4,000 € 
4,000 – 5,000 € 
> 5,000 € 
No Answer 
51 
85 
44 
13 
8 
8 
14 
22.87 
38.12 
19.73 
5.83 
3.59 
3.59 
6.28 
Religion Catholic 
Evangelic 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
70 
71 
5 
10 
67 
31.39 
31.84 
2.24 
4.48 
30.04 
Voting 
behavior 
The Christian Democratic / Christian 
Social Union 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Greens 
The Free Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
Other 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
43 
 
49 
42 
25 
17 
9 
17 
21 
19.28 
 
21.97 
18.83 
11.21 
7.62 
4.04 
7.62 
9.42 
   223 100.00 
 
 
Table A3: Charitable giving habits of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Donated before Yes 
No 
189 
34 
84.75 
15.25 
Modal charitable 
purpose1 
Child or disabled care 
Emergency aid 
Medical research 
Church and religious purposes 
Environment or animal protection 
Development aid 
General (e.g. Red Cross, 
charitable lotteries) 
Culture 
Politics 
Local welfare services, homeless 
persons, poverty 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
46 
12 
13 
11 
32 
39 
20 
 
3 
2 
8 
 
37 
20.63 
5.38 
5.83 
4.93 
14.35 
17.49 
8.97 
 
1.35 
0.90 
3.59 
 
16.59 
Contribution 
receipt received 
Always 
Mostly 
Sometimes 
Never 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
60 
36 
42 
49 
36 
26.91 
16.14 
18.83 
21.97 
16.14 
Donated in 2009 Yes 
No 
67 
156 
30.04 
69.96 
   223 100.00 
1) If subjects stated that they have donated before they were asked to which charity they donated most 
frequently. If subjects gave more than one answer the charity named first was included. 
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Table A4: Attitudes of participants towards society and government responsibilities 
Question / Statement Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Compared with how others live in 
Germany: Do you think you get 
your fair share, more than your fair 
share, somewhat less or very much 
less than your fair share? 
Very much less 
Somewhat less 
Fair share 
More than fair share 
Don’t know 
20 
61 
104 
19 
19 
8.97 
27.36 
46.64 
8.52 
8.52 
All in all, I think the social 
differences in this country are just. 
 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
Don’t know 
14 
65 
90 
50 
4 
6.28 
29.15 
40.36 
22.42 
1.79 
It is the responsibility of the state 
to meet everyone’s needs, even in 
case of sickness, poverty, 
unemployment and old age. 
 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
 Don’t know 
74 
104 
35 
4 
6 
33.18 
46.64 
15.70 
1.79 
2.69 
It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the 
differences in income between 
people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes. 
 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Can’t choose, don’t know 
32 
73 
39 
48 
17 
14 
14.35 
32.74 
17.49 
21.52 
7.62 
6.28 
 ∑ 223 100.00 
 
 
Figure A1: Proceedings of the experiment 
1. Distribution of instructions 
2. Drawing of ID numbers 
3. Oral presentation of important instruction details 
4. Donation decision 
6. Questionnaire 
5. Collection of donations 
With information 
 Disabled care (low or high revenues) 
 Development aid (low or high revenues) 
 Medical research (low or high revenues) 
 Animal protection (low or high revenues) 
Without information 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
Note: The treatments with information are identical to the treatments without information except for the fact that in the 
donation stage subjects could choose between a small organization (with revenues between €40,000 and €300,000) and 
a large organization (with revenues between €5 million and €11 million) for each charitable purpose. 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions (translated from German) 
 
Welcome! 
Thank you very much for participating in our study for the analysis of consumer behavior. 
Enclosed in this folder, you find information which you need during this event. You may 
return pages to which you have already gone through at any time. Please turn pages only up to 
the next “stop-sign”. You will be asked to turn to the next page. Please only read the 
respective text and do not act until you receive specific instructions to follow the assignment.  
Please follow the instructions carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to other 
participants.  
We want to emphasize that all information which we gain from today’s event will only be 
used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data about the 
participants will be published or passed on.  
Shortly, we will come up to your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number on it. 
This number will serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the study. 
Please state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID ensures 
anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that belongs to it. 
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 1  
For your participation in the study, you will receive 40 Euros. Shortly, we will hand out the 
money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. Afterwards, you will get the 
opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a charitable cause. 
There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause. The money which you, if 
any, will donate, will be completely transferred to the respective charity. We guarantee that 
this will happen lawfully and will have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of 
the notary’s office, Dr. Rainer Preusche. 
All selected charitable organizations hold the “donation seal” by the state-approved German 
Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen (DZI)). This 
assures that the organizations act autonomously and charitably and that the usage of their 
financial means is reviewable, economical and statutory. The names of the individual 
organizations will at this point – for scientific reasons – not be mentioned. We guarantee that 
all information you receive from us regarding the organizations is true. At the end of the 
experiment, we are happy to hand to you a list of all organizations upon request.  
Following, we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can donate in the 
course of this study.  
The four charitable causes are: 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid  
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 [Additional part mentioned only in the Info Treatment:  
The organizations you can make a donation to do not only differ with regard to their 
charitable causes, but also their revenues, which these organizations have generated in 2006 
from donations, membership fees and government grants. For each charitable cause, we offer 
you a charitable organization with relatively small revenues between 40,000 and 300,000 
Euros and organizations with rather large revenues between 5 million Euros and 11 million 
Euros.  
Therefore, we ask you, in the case you donate, to pick one of the following organizations: 
a. Medical research Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
b. Medical research Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
c. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
d. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
e. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
f. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
g. Development aid Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
h. Development aid Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. €] 
 
We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your participation in our 
study. 
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one blue envelope  
- 40 Euros, composed of two 10 Euro-bills, one 5 Euro-bill, six 2 Euro-
coins and three 1 Euro-coins   
- one receipt.  
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm that you 
have received 40 Euros from ZEW for the participation in this study. We need the receipt for 
administrative purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. Your 
data is still handled confidentially and anonymized. We will now collect the receipts, the 
study will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously whether 
and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned charitable 
organizations. The amount of money you put into the blue envelope will benefit a charitable 
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cause and will be transferred completely to the respective charity after the experiment. You 
will keep the amount of money you put into the white envelope. 
 
The study proceeds as follows: 
1.) Make your donation decision. 
In case of a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue envelope. 
Please note that you have to choose one of the four [in the Info treatment: eight] charities 
given. It is not possible to choose more than one charitable organization for your donation. 
Please tick only one organization if you wish to donate. If you tick more than one 
organization, unfortunately, we will not be able to transfer the donation. If you do not wish to 
donate, please do not tick any organization.  
2.) Write down your ID-number into the predefined box on the blue envelope, irrespective of 
whether you wish to donate or not.  
3.) Put the desired donation amount into the blue envelope.  
4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep into the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed 40 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please note 
that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired amount of 
money into both envelopes. It is also possible to put 40 Euros completely into one envelope.  
5.) Seal up both envelopes.  
 
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the blue envelope. 
When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please keep the white envelope. 
We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to the charitable organization lawfully 
and have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of the notary’s office, Dr. Rainer 
Preusche.  
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make your 
decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
 
Part 2 – Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by ticking or filling out.  
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you and answer your 
question. Please do not say your question out loud and please do not talk to other participants. 
 
1. What is your ID-number?    __________ 
 
2. How can your marital status be described? 
O unmarried 
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O married 
O divorced 
O widowed 
 
3. Please state your gender: 
O male  
O female 
 
4. What is your year of birth?  __________ 
 
5. How many people, including you, live in your household?    
       __________ 
 
6. How many children live in your household? 
O 0-3 years old    __________ 
O 4-7 years old    __________ 
O 8-12 years old    __________ 
O 13-18 years old   __________ 
O older than 18 years   __________ 
O none     
 
7. What is your religious affiliation? 
O Catholic 
O Protestant 
O Muslim 
O Jewish 
O Buddhist 
O other:     __________ 
O no religion 
 
8. What is your highest educational achievement? 
O University/College 
O higher education entrance qualification 
O middle school 
O secondary modern school 
O other:     __________ 
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O none 
 
9. What is your original nationality?  
O German 
O Turkish 
O Italian 
O Polish  
O other:     __________ 
 
10. What is your first language?   __________ 
 
11. What are the monthly net earnings of your household (how much money per month is 
available for your household altogether?) 
O below 1,000 Euros 
O 1,000 – 2,000 Euros 
O 2,000 – 3,000 Euros 
O 3,000 – 4,000 Euros 
O 4,000 – 5,000 Euros 
O above 5,000 Euros 
O not specified 
 
12. Which party would you vote for if there were federal elections on the coming Sunday?  
O CDU/CSU 
O SPD 
O Bündnis 90 / The Green Party 
O FDP 
O The Left 
O Other 
O I do not vote 
O not specified 
 
14. Have you made a donation to a charitable organization before?  
O yes  O no 
 
15. To which purpose have you to date donated most often?  
____________________ 
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 16. Have you already donated this year to a charitable organization? 
 O yes  O no 
 
17. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, in which month have you donated last?  
 ____________________ 
 
18. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, how much have you donated this year altogether?  
 _____________________ € 
 
19. Have you ever received a donation receipt for your donation?  
 O always 
 O mostly 
 O occasionally 
 O never 
 
20. Compared with how others live in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, more 
than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share? 
 O fair share 
 O more than fair share 
 O somewhat less than fair share 
 O very much less than fair share 
 O don’t know 
 
21. On the whole, I find the social differences in our country just.  
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
 
22. The State must ensure that people can live a decent income even in illness, hardship, 
unemployment and old age.   
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
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 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
 
23. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.  
 O Agree strongly.  
 O Agree. 
 O Neither agree nor disagree. 
 O Disagree. 
 O Disagree strongly. 
 O Can’t choose.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
We would like to ask you to write down general comments regarding our study. You may also 
give reasons for your donation decision. [11 empty lines follow] 
We would like to thank you for participating in our study and wish you a nice day! Please 
remember to take the white envelope with you. 
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Appendix C: Invitation letter used for recruitment of participants (translated from 
German) 
 
The following writing was sent via private carriers to randomly selected households in the 
municipal area of Mannheim. The front page shows the logo of ZEW at the top of the letter, 
general contact information of the project manager and the following text: 
 
Ref.: Invitation to a scientific study on consumer behavior 
 
Dear Sir or dear Madam, 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim is a non-profit-making 
research institute, which is active in the field of applied economics. At present, ZEW is 
conducting a scientific study in the range of individual consumption decisions. In order to 
carry out our scientific study, we are looking for participants. For this reason, we would like 
to invite you.  
For your participation in the study, which lasts about 60 minutes, you will receive 40 Euros 
in cash. With the money, you will be able to make consumption decisions during the study. 
The money spent will be subtracted from the 40 Euros you received. If you do not spend any 
money, you will be paid out 40 Euros without deductions. In doing so, your decisions will be 
voluntary and anonymous at all times. Only the ZEW researcher team will know your 
identity, your statements will be treated with the utmost discretion and according to the Data 
Protection Act.  
Please consider the following requirements for the participation in the study: 
 registration by phone, 
 residence in Mannheim (verification with, for example, your identity card), 
 very good knowledge of the German language,  
 between 18 and 75 years old 
 arriving on time on the selected date and presenting this letter  
If you would like to take part in the study and meet the conditions mentioned above, please 
choose one of the dates listed on the next page and register by telephone. The selection of 
participants is carried out according to scientific criteria. The event will be taking place at the 
ZEW. At the end of the event, you will receive 40 Euros in cash minus the amount which you 
have possibly spent for your personal consumption. Should you have any further questions, 
please do not hesitate to call us at 0621/1235-395 from June 29th to July 15th 2009, 4pm to 
6pm. 
We are looking forward to welcoming you as participants in our study.  
Yours sincerely, 
Sarah Borgloh (project manager) 
 
The back page offers further information concerning the study: 
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Registration: 
Please call from June 29th to July 15th 2009 (Monday to Friday) between 4pm and 6pm at 
the following number: 0621/1235-395. Please state the date (see below) that you want to 
participate at. For the registration, your name will be noted, however, as explained above, will 
not be published or given to a third party. Please take note that with the receipt of this letter, 
you do not have any claim to participate. The selection of participants will be carried out 
according to scientific criteria.  
 
Dates (day, date, time): 
Sat, July 18th 2009, 9-10am Tue, July 21st 2009, 9-10am  
Sat, July 18th 2009, 11-12am Tue, July 21st 2009, 5-6pm  
Sat, July 18th 2009, 2-3pm Tue, July 21st 2009, 7-8pm  
Mon, July 20th 2009, 9-10am Wed, July 22nd 2009, 9-10am 
Mon, July 20th 2009, 5-6pm Wed, July 22nd 2009, 5-6pm 
Mon, July 20th 2009, 7-8pm      Wed, July 22nd 2009, 7-8pm 
 
It follows a map of the location of ZEW and general information about the ZEW taken from 
the homepage of ZEW, www.zew.de. 
 
